Russia’s war in Ukraine has dragged on for three years. Western analysts believe that any decisive change in the battlefield stalemate will not happen soon. They say the main battle is now political. Russian President Vladimir Putin is betting on the division and ambivalence of the West. He hopes that what he could not achieve in the battlefield, the victory will be handed over to him by the West.
European governments have stepped up cooperation in recent months, fearing the consequences of a U.S. withdrawal and the collapse of Ukraine. Collectively, their supplies or promised arms are greater than Washington’s. It can be doubled if financial support is included. This is a big change from the early days of the war. But even this change did not bring the pace of war in favor of Ukraine.
When and how will this war end? The Kremlin has made it clear that it will only negotiate if Ukraine surrenders. Ukraine, on the other hand, has similarly said it will counter Moscow’s attack. Two years later, no sign of peace is evident in Europe.
US media outlet Foreign Policy spoke to eight analysts about what could happen next in the ongoing war in Ukraine. The statements of four of them are highlighted:
Prohibition takes time to reap the benefits
Agathe Demaris
Columnist, Foreign Policy and Senior Policy Fellow, European Council on Foreign Relations
What have we learned from two years of Western financial and trade sanctions on Russia? Three themes will determine the way forward. First, Moscow is winning the information war against sanctions, as these sanctions are generally believed to be ineffective. Arguments to the contrary are hard to make: the Kremlin and its supporters are active in intimidating anyone who dares to point out the sanctions’ success. (A real question: If sanctions are truly ineffective, why is the Kremlin so busy fighting them?) The skewed debate among Western publics about the failure of sanctions is not helping. Newspaper headlines typically focus on fraudulent schemes supporting Russia’s efforts to hold onto semiconductors. Smuggling certainly exists, but the real difference is more subtle than what appears in the headlines. The big picture is that Russia’s imports of modern technology have fallen by about 40 percent from pre-war levels. But now Russia’s advanced needs have increased so much, which was never before. This is not enough to stop Moscow’s war machine, and more needs to be done to strengthen export controls. Still, the 40 percent reduction in bans is a significant achievement.
Second, the impact of sanctions on Russian trade is increasingly visible—especially in sectors deprived of Western equipment and know-how. Such as space and energy. Russian companies face increasing maintenance complications while lacking US and European technology. A Siberian airline, S-Seven, had to ground its Airbus planes and lay off many workers in January due to a lack of engine parts. The same month a major Russian oil refinery, Lukoil, had to shut down a unit after a Western-made compressor broke down. More such events are likely to emerge in 2024. These events highlight the important fact that sanctions are like a marathon, not a short race. The cumulative effect of these will gradually become apparent. Despite grand claims of unlimited Sino-Russian friendship, Chinese equipment cannot fully meet Russia’s high-tech needs, at least at this stage.
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Third, the future of Russia’s central bank reserves will be debated among the West and will dominate discussions among like-minded allies. On the one hand, the United States and Britain are pressuring Western countries to confiscate Russia’s foreign exchange assets and transfer them to Ukraine. They argue that doing so is moral: the aggressor must pay. On the other hand, several European Union countries, including Belgium, France and Germany, are opposing the plan. This, they argue, will undermine confidence in Western financial infrastructure and currencies. The European Central Bank (and, more shockingly, the International Monetary Fund—IMF) has joined this cautious camp. Most of Russia’s real estate is in Belgium. Nothing can be done about them without the consent of EU countries. Yet Brussels, Paris and Berlin are unlikely to change positions. Especially as the trans-Atlantic relationship heads into wait and review ahead of the US presidential election in November. As a result, Russia’s reserve seizure in 2024 seems unlikely.
How can Ukraine defend itself?
Franz-Stefan Gaddy
Consulting Senior Fellow, International Institute for Strategic Studies
Ukraine is increasingly focusing on its own production to reduce dependence on Western arms supplies. The results are clear. For example, self-made maritime drones have been used in attacks on Russian fleets in the Black Sea. They have also used homegrown weapons and drones on defense-related installations and infrastructure deep in Russia. However, Kiev has rarely commented on these attacks. However, these attacks are believed to have been carried out by Ukrainian-made drones.
In the 2024 defense budget, Ukraine still has allocated about 6.8 billion dollars for the purchase of foreign equipment.
Ukraine is looking to develop and expand its arms industry due to wartime conditions. It is getting the support of Western governments, defense companies and private enterprises. For example, Germany’s Rheinmetall wants to start manufacturing armored vehicles in Ukraine this year. The Alliance of Defense Industries in Kiev has recruited more than 60 companies, including foreign firms, to facilitate investment in the Ukrainian defense sector and localize production. Turkish drone maker Baykar has announced it has started building a drone factory in Ukraine.
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Ukraine is becoming a laboratory for new ways of building and manufacturing weapons. Without much government guidance, the private sector and citizen initiatives have developed a decentralized innovation ecosystem collaborating on electronic warfare systems, cyber security, attack drones, maritime drones, munitions, war management technology and more. Kiev has developed a coordination forum. From where thousands of project applications have been received for these initiatives. Dozens of defense contracts have resulted. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense has reformed and accelerated the certification process for new weapons directly tested on the battlefield. The key challenge is not how to innovate, but how to increase production due to shortages of skilled labor, supply chain disruptions, corruption and Russian aggression.
One possible way to expand Ukraine’s military industrial base is joint production under written contracts with Western companies on NATO territory. which will be managed by a specific investment fund. Not only would this ensure a steady supply of NATO-quality weapons to Ukraine against the wishes of the West, it would also send a strong message to Moscow. And that is – Moscow may not have time and the West is on Kiev’s side despite the unrest.
Which way will the war go now?
David Petraeus
Chairman, KKR Global Institute and former CIA Director and retired US General
The answer to any question about the future of Russia’s war in Ukraine depends on many things. Because indeed the course of the war depends on many important developments.
First of all, the US Congress will ultimately approve any level of cooperation. This is significant, as the United States alone has provided almost as much military assistance as all of Europe combined. It will also depend on the US decision to supply certain weapons like Western tanks and fighter jets. Seeing them, other countries have also decided to give these weapons in the past.
In terms of financial assistance, European countries have provided twice as much assistance to Ukraine as the United States. Consequently, the level of European cooperation is equally important.
It is also important to end US-led efforts to tighten sanctions and export controls on Russia and to stop efforts to circumvent them. Despite considerable success to date, evasion strategies are evolving and will require constant attention to prevent them.
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Some other tools are particularly important in security support. In the near future, Ukraine may receive systems that will enable the country to detect, identify and destroy attacking drones, rockets, missiles and aircraft. Ukraine’s key needs include long-range precision missiles, Western fighter jets, artillery ammunition and additional cluster bombs, which have proven particularly important in deterring Russian aggression.
Needless to say, the course of the war will depend on the determination and determination of the Ukrainians and Russians. The ability to recruit new troops, train them, equip them with weapons will depend a lot on the respective capabilities of both the countries. Putin seems to be in control of Russia. But it should not be assumed that this support of the people will remain unwavering in the face of mounting casualties and loss of life as the war progresses.
Besides these, much will depend on the unmanned capabilities of both sides. For example, Ukraine-made naval drone attacks forced Russia to withdraw its naval forces from Crimea. As a result, Kiev is able to export grain to different countries through the Black Sea.
More than $300 billion in Russian reserves held in Western countries would have significant implications if they were given to Ukraine as compensation. This would hurt Russia and make Ukraine more capable of fighting against Russia.
Ultimately, the course of the war will depend on both sides’ ability to learn from experience and adapt to the battlefield. It will also depend in part on the development, production and deployment of new weapons systems and other technologies, and on the development of the skills of leadership, officers, troops and units.
The year could be a tough time on the battlefield for the armies of both countries. Two years on, no easy end to the war is in sight.
The future will be determined by the Western divide
C. King Mohan
Columnist, Foreign Policy and Visiting Professor, National University of Singapore
Ukraine’s failure to make significant military achievements by 2023 has created deep divisions in the West. This division may seem unexpected, but not surprising. Any major war has a strong influence on the internal politics of the countries directly and indirectly involved. Military disasters can often intensify internal political crises. Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Europe and the West has now created serious differences over the issue of terms of war and peace. These divisions are acute within the US political class, between the US and its European allies, in Western and Eastern Europe, and in Central Europe. While Ukraine has paid a high price for defending itself against Russian aggression, the country has not been spared division over the conduct of the war. All these apparent divisions are in contrast to the apparent unity of Russia. Last June, President Vladimir Putin further consolidated his control of the mercenary Wagner Group insurgency in Moscow.
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The rapidly increasing costs of war will test the ability of all parties to maintain internal cohesion. While authoritarianism may help Russia quell the divisions in its own country, it is hard to believe that the enormous economic and human toll of Putin’s war will have no political ramifications. For now, though, the question is whether the West will be able to prevent multiple splits in positions on Ukraine. The West’s vast economic superiority over Russia should lead Ukraine to an easy victory in a protracted war with Moscow. The West has been slow to respond to this cooperation. The year 2024 will show us whether the West can adopt the strategy of cooperation necessary to survive Ukraine’s ongoing war against Russia in the short term. That war is going on longer than expected.
Ukraine’s war is presenting two different paths for Europe. One is the deterioration of the continent’s strategic relationship with the United States and Asia due to its reluctance to build capacity out of concern for its own security. The other is a path to geopolitical revitalization by strengthening its defense capabilities, developing a strategic vision to enhance the continent’s role in the world, and thereby shaping the long-term balance of power in Eurasia. If Europe is truly prepared to move forward with security in mind, it will be easier to keep up with the Americans and deter future Russian regimes from territorial expansion. Moscow can be persuaded to play a legitimate role in guaranteeing the security of European territory. Alternatively, Europeans could hope that a future US president could set the possibility of direct talks with Moscow and Beijing.
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