The circumstances are not similar to Mali, Burkina Faso or Niger but the Government is already renegotiating the US presence in its territory
MADRID, 4 (EUROPA PRESS)
The Sahel has been experiencing a series of chain coups in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, which have been inexorably followed by the departure of the French troops present in these former colonies and a rapprochement of the military junta with Russia in search of military support. The fear now is that Chad could follow in their footsteps and leave the West without a key ally in the region to combat terrorism.
The case of Chad is particular because although its current president, Mahamat Idriss Déby, irregularly succeeded his father, Idriss Déby, who died in combat against a rebel group in April 2021, thanks to the support of the Army, he has not come including among the coups d’état in the region. The country is now called to the polls this Monday and, barring a major surprise, the son of the man who was president for more than 30 years, will now be democratically elected as head of state.
The visit that Mahamat Idriss Déby made to Moscow last January, when he met with the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, set off the first alarms. “I have come as a friendly country, a brother country and a sovereign country that wants to strengthen its relations with a friendly country,” explained the Chadian president, to whom Putin offered whatever support was necessary.
In a recent interview with RFI and France24, Déby returned to this visit to ensure that he had a “very fruitful” conversation with Putin and argued that not everything boils down to military cooperation. Asked specifically if this means that Chad is going to abandon its traditional alliance with France, he was emphatic: “Chad is an independent, free and sovereign country.”
“We are not on the principle of a slave who wants to change owners. We intend to work with all the countries in the world that respect us and that want to work with us under mutual respect,” he pointed out, emphasizing in any case that at his The country is above all interested in economic cooperation and not just military cooperation.
DIFFERENT CIRCUMSTANCES
The truth is that, as Thierry Vircoulon, associate researcher at the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI) explains in a podcast about Chad from the ‘think-tank’ Crisis Group, the country “is not in the same situation” as Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, “that is, does not face a significant security threat and does not have strong security stress.”
While in the other three countries, which have now created the Association of Sahel States (AES) jihadist groups are wreaking havoc and gaining ground, Chad only faces the terrorist threat in the lake area that gives it its name, where both what remains of Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) operate.
However, as the ACLED project highlights, it is a country of “endemic instability” as proven by the fact that between January 2022 and March 2024 it has recorded 270 acts of political violence that left more than 1,025 dead. In 2021, one of the most turbulent years in the country’s recent history, there were 822 deaths in conflict.
That year was precisely the one in which President Idriss Déby died in clashes with the rebel group Front for Alternation and Concord in Chad (FACT). Since 2021, at least 400 people have died in combat with this rebel group, while at least 73 died at the hands of the Army during protests for the extension of the transition period in October 2022.
“The State maintains its presence by managing complex clientelist networks, allowing a certain degree of violence among its clients as a means to control and strongly repress any form of dissent,” summarizes ACLED. “These methods have offered relative stability, but at the same time they have exacerbated internal tensions, fueled community conflicts and facilitated the infiltration of armed groups into some areas of Lake Chad or the borders with Libya and Sudan,” he adds.
NEED FOR SUPPORT FOR THE CONTINUITY OF THE REGIME
“The need for support for the regime after the upcoming presidential elections could present an opportunity for Russia to move forward with its offers of security assistance,” said Liam Karr, an expert on the Critical Threats project, in a recent analysis in the which recalls the death during a police operation of the leader of the Socialists Without Borders Party, Yaya Dillo last February, as does ACLED, emphasizing that he was one of the president’s rivals.
Furthermore, adds Karr, “Déby also faces internal tensions with the ruling elite over its management of the civil war in neighboring Sudan” where it cooperates with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in its support of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). clashes with the Sudanese Army in exchange for financial aid, which has generated unrest in the Chadian Army and the political elite.
“The Kremlin is willing to offer direct security to the regime in ways that the West would not, such as sending protection forces and organizing information operations to monitor against popular or elite coups,” highlights this expert, for whom “Russia likely seeks to increase its influence in Chad by undermining and eventually driving the West out of the region.”
“Chad is now increasingly important on the geopolitical chessboard of the Sahel since if it followed the path of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger it would be as if Moscow got ‘the Fat One’,” acknowledges Thierry Vircoulon, who also has an impact that the Wagner paramilitary group – now renamed Africa Corps – in addition to already being present in these three countries, is also present in other border countries such as Libya – where it supports Marshal Khalifa Haftar -, in Sudan – supporting the RSF — and in the Central African Republic, where he supports the president.
GEOPOLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF CHAD
Thus, the country has become a key player for the West in its anti-terrorist fight and currently hosts what is the largest French military base on the continent. Although anti-French sentiment is not as deep here as in other Sahel countries, there are “some clear seeds in public opinion” in Chad, acknowledges Remadji Hoinathy, an expert on Lake Chad at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in the aforementioned podcast.
Added to this complex context is the renegotiation of the presence of US troops (around a hundred troops in the country). Following the discontent expressed by the Chadian Government, the United States has proceeded to temporarily withdraw dozens of its soldiers while it closes the terms for their deployment with N’Djamena.
“Chad’s central location in the Sahel makes it important for all actors in the region, as it serves as a dam against or potential bridge between the combatants, weapons and illicit networks that surround it,” summarizes Liam Karr, for who “a reduced Western presence in Chad would undermine efforts to contain these threats and limit the growing risk to regional partners and Europe.”
However, “the lack of strong military ties between Russia and Chad and the West’s continued willingness to cooperate with Chad despite democratic and human rights concerns could slow down or discourage cooperation” between N’Djamena and Moscow, he predicts.
