Any talk about gathering the five parties around one table is just nonsense, and Batelli’s talk about the necessity of showing good intentions is not consistent with the parties’ insistence on clinging to their privileges that have come to shape their identities.
Al-Arab Al-Londoniya – Talks are still ongoing about the five-party table project proposed by UN envoy Abdullah Bathili on November 23, as an initiative to resolve the worsening political crisis and as a step towards consensus in order to reach a date for presidential and parliamentary elections in Libya.
Batelli’s initiative is based on bringing together the five big players in formulating the Libyan decision, namely the head of the Presidential Council, the head of the House of Representatives, the commander-in-chief of the army, the head of the State Council, and the head of the outgoing Government of National Unity, who will not meet together in any way, and will not help resolve the crisis or set a date for the elections, especially since each of them has his own agenda, political reference, social base, and regional and international alliances.
The realistic interpretation of the current scene in Libya is that there is a competition for the spoils between the various parties, and that those who hold the reins of power are not ready to give it up or the privileges they enjoy. The former advisor to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Stephanie Williams, called them the dinosaurs of politics, and said that some politicians They are committed to maintaining the status quo that gives them access to state coffers, likening many of them to dinosaurs, and clearly confirmed that they see any change through the formation of a temporary executive authority or holding national elections as an inevitable end to their privileges and their ability to access state coffers and resources, and thus putting an end to the regime. Nepotism which they have skillfully developed over the past years.
◙ Any talk about bringing the five parties together around one table is just nonsense, and Batelli’s talk about the need to show good intentions does not fit with the parties’ insistence on clinging to their privileges.
Batelli said that they are standing still, and have not shown a firm commitment to ending the political stalemate, and that they are adopting tactics to postpone the solution, and thus he concludes the same conclusion as his predecessors, which is that the parties riding on the throne of power are not ready to step down or give it up, as long as there is money, travel, guards, and official processions. Relationships at the highest level, social prestige, and immunity guarantee escape from prosecution and punishment.
We are now facing five figures, one of whom is Aguila Saleh, who has held the presidency of the House of Representatives for nine years and six months, and is ready to remain for another ten years, especially after he achieved an important breakthrough by normalizing his relations with the Turks and Qataris. As for the State Council, it consists of the remnants of the General National Congress. Its election dates back to June 2012, and which was deliberately recycled in the Skhirat Agreement eight years ago in the form of an advisory body that quickly turned into a parallel legislative institution capable of lifting the “veto” in the face of the elected parliament, which is supposed to be the only internationally recognized legislative body.
The relationship between the House of Representatives and the state does not seem to be proceeding smoothly, nor is it qualified to be a starting point for a political solution. The greatest evidence of this is the mere fact that their presidents, Aguila Saleh and Khaled Al-Mishri, reached an agreement to form a mini-government, instead of the outgoing government of national unity, to undertake the management of state affairs. On all its territories and supervising the organization of elections, it prompted a number of influential parties internally and externally to move forcefully last August to exclude Al-Mishri from the presidency of the State Council and replace him with Muhammad Takala, who has proven so far that he is entrusted with the task of thwarting the attempts of the House of Representatives to overthrow the government that Al-Dabaiba formed and has headed since. March 2021, which was scheduled to run the country’s affairs for eight months ending with the handover of power to the authority that was to be elected in December of the same year. According to the agreement issued by the Dialogue Conference in the Tunis and Geneva meetings in November and December 2020, and then in the Geneva meeting in February 2021, the extent of the legitimacy of the unity government would have ended in June 2022, which of course was not achieved, as was previously the case with the Government of National Accord headed by Fayez al-Sarraj, which was formed to rule. The country will remain in power for a maximum period of 18 months if it remains governed according to a de facto policy for five years.
As for the Presidential Council, according to the powers assigned to it, it is incapable of having any real impact on the public scene from outside the scope of the protocol, and the percentage of its inability is increased by the conflicts within it that express the contradictions between its president and its two members, as well as by its submission in a large part of its decisions and proposals to other authorities that possess Mechanisms for controlling decision-making centers in Tripoli, while its president, Mohammed Al-Manfi, appears as if he is walking on a rope with a stick in his hands, trying to maintain his balance.
◙ The realistic interpretation of the current scene in Libya is that there is competition for spoils between the various parties, and that those holding the reins of power are not prepared to give them up or the privileges they enjoy.
There is also the army leadership represented by General Khalifa Haftar, who has succeeded, at least so far, in imposing the nature of the political system that he wants to establish for rule. He has absolute authority over 70 percent of the country’s area, and he is the closest thing to the head of the ruling Supreme Military Council in Its areas of influence extend to the east, center, and south, and it has broad capabilities that allow it to implement its political, economic, and even cultural and sporting vision, and to arrange its regional and international relations based on the interests that it espouses and defends.
It would be political and visionary blindness to believe that the general is exercising his authority and implementing his vision in the way we have seen for years, to hand over power to a head of state in Tripoli, if he is not that president himself, or that he will relinquish the general command of the army while he is alive to anyone else, regardless of his status or worthiness of it. Perhaps his reliance on his sons in a number of major responsibilities and sensitive positions is the best evidence that he is forming around him a circle of rule that cannot be penetrated in any way.
Any talk about bringing the five parties together around one table is just nonsense, and Batelli’s talk about the need to show good intentions does not fit with the insistence of the parties on clinging to their privileges that have come to constitute their political and social identities, and for the international community to rely on the wisdom of Dabaiba, Haftar, Al-Menfi, Aguila Saleh or Takala, this means that the international community is ignorant of what is happening in the Libyan arena, and it is only dealing with the surface as happened in 2011, which makes it far from the depth and the contradictions that are brewing in it, which often turn into secret agreements to keep the situation as it is in a way that serves the interests of all those moving in the geography of the Libyan decision.
In no way can we rely on the possibility of reaching a solution by bringing together the Big Five, and if the international community wants to reach a solution, it only has to be convinced that the basic forces in Libya are the leadership of the army in Al-Rajma Benghazi, and the authority of the militias moving under February slogans in the western region, especially In Tripoli and Misrata, and the financial and business lobbies, regional balances, and oil and gas deals, which are now represented by Engineer Abdul Hamid Al-Dabaiba, and the followers of the former regime with all their formations and positions at home and abroad, in prison and in power, as well as representatives of minorities and civil society activists, with an international commitment to move directly towards bringing together the Libyans under constitutional cover. Able to contain intellectual and ideological differences and overcome partisan and political conflicts.
Black lover
Tunisian writer
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2024-06-28 07:52:15